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Why is it so diﬃ  cult for the Global Fund to show value for 
money?
The paper in The Lancet Global Health by Victoria Fan 
and colleagues1 is important because it describes what 
several people close to the Global Fund to ﬁ ght AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria already know: there is a 
problem with its disbursement mechanisms. Fan and 
colleagues correctly state that the Global Fund should 
“redesign this system to explicitly link a portion of 
the funds to a simple performance measure in health 
coverage or outcomes, measured independently and 
robustly”.1 I applaud Fan and colleagues for having 
done the number-crunching, which involved 508 
projects over a 10-year period. Yet they did not analyse 
the underlying reasons for this poor linkage between 
funding and performance and did not provide practical 
suggestions about what should be improved. This 
Comment aims to ﬁ ll that gap.
First, the Global Fund uses the term “performance-
based ﬁ nancing” in a confusing manner because it refers 
to a contractual relationship at the macro level between 
the Global Fund and the recipients. Yet a rapidly 
growing number of countries (at least 30) use the term 
performance-based ﬁ nancing in a diﬀ erent manner. For 
them performance-based ﬁ nancing is a health-reform 
movement with a clear deﬁ nition, best practices, and 
implementation instruments.2
Moreover, experts2 suggest that only by applying a 
minimum number of best practices and instruments 
can a programme be labelled as performance-
based ﬁ nancing. The criteria include the existence 
of autonomous management for health facilities; a 
competitive environment for contracts with both public 
and private providers; good governance by separating 
the functions of provision, regulation, contract 
development, and payments; and moving away from 
input ﬁ nancing to performance payments. It is clear that 
the Global Fund’s interpretation of performance-based 
ﬁ nancing does not meet these criteria, which explains 
the diﬃ  culty in ﬁ nding a positive link between funding 
and performance. 
Fan and colleagues are kind to the Global Fund by 
only addressing the issue of linking predictors to fund 
disbursements. They could also have ventured into 
sensitive qualitative issues such as the corruption 
charges in Malawi, Mauritania, Mali, Zambia, and 
Djibouti.3 Yet, according to performance-based ﬁ nancing 
theory, the transparency problems were likely to happen 
because the Global Fund’s performance-based ﬁ nancing 
approach stops at the national level and fails to work 
with recipient governments or organisations on how to 
ensure “performance” at the level where it matters: the 
health facilities, the community, and the patients. Good 
governance issues such as separation of functions are not 
addressed at the Global Fund, which, like several other 
aid agencies, supports corrupting input monopolies such 
as centrally buying essential drugs and equipment. Its 
projects require hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth 
of drugs, equipment, bednets, ambulances, etc, instead 
of injecting money into the local economy through 
competitive contracts with health facilities and thereby 
directly paying for performance in terms of outputs, 
quality of services, and equity. 
In 2012, I attended a few meetings between Global 
Fund managers and the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and noted that it was unclear 
what was expected in terms of performance. When 
challenged, the Global Fund managers claimed to be 
mere administrators and not technical (health reform) 
experts. Yet the Global Fund demands all kinds of 
data on indicators and audits, which the government 
representatives felt were confusing. One indeed needs 
to collect indicators at national level, but ﬁ eld workers 
know that in many countries such data—if available at 
all—are of very poor quality. Therefore if the Global Fund 
wants quality data, it should discuss with the recipients 
about how to acquire this.
In summary, the Global Fund should assist recipients 
with: (a) setting up decentralised contract development, 
veriﬁ cation, and coaching agencies that feed into the 
national level; (b) assuring the separation of functions 
between regulation, provision, contract development, 
and payment at all levels of the health system; (c) 
stimulating competition between health facilities for 
scarce government or aid agency resources; and (d) 
moving away from central and monopolistic input 
ﬁ nancing towards a system whereby health facilities buy 
their own inputs from competitive distributors.
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Until a few years ago, the World Bank had similar 
problems to the Global Fund, but after painful lessons 
the Bank is now ﬁ rmly moving towards the wider 
health-reform approach of performance-based 
ﬁ nancing. I hope Global Fund representatives will not 
be defensive but pick up the suggestions here and start 
reforming their manner of working.
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